While
it’s no secret that loose monetary policy on the Fed’s part benefits stocks and
can lead to credit bubbles, researchers tend to underestimate the effect tight
money policy has in creating market crashes and economic recessions. Restrictive money policy on the Fed’s part
has frequently led to falling stock prices.
The extent and duration of the monetary tightness is what determines the
severity of the bear market. The longer
the Fed restricts money, the more severe the downturn will be.
Consider
the bear market of 1973-74. The Dow
Jones Industrial Average experienced a decline of 40 percent, which at the time
was the worst bear market since the Great Depression. The Dow peaked in early 1973 at an all-time
high of 1150 before commencing a Chinese water torture type decline for the
next two years. The decline was
precipitated by tight money on the part of the Fed, which began raising
interest rates in early 1972.
It
wasn’t until mid 1974 that the Fed began lowering rates and loosening
money. Although it took about six months
to have the desired effect, by 1975 the Dow launched a recovery rally which by
early 1976 had completely retraced the decline of 1973-74.
The
next major crash was of course the October 1987 stock market crash which
witnessed a 1-day drop of 22% in the Dow.
Not surprisingly, the October ’87 crash was preceded by a rising fed
funds interest rate in the year prior to the crash. The effective rate rose from approximately 5.8
percent a year before the crash to around 7.3 percent at the time of the crash.
By
far the most egregious example of the Fed abusing its power to engineer a
financial debacle occurred in the period between 2004 and 2007. This was the 3-year period that transitioned
into the credit crisis of 2007-2009. The
Federal Reserve under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan raised the interest
rate from 1 percent in 2004 to just over 5 percent in 2006. Rates were then left at this level for
another year before being reduced. By
that time, however, the damage had been done and it was too little, too
late.
The
interest rate hike of 2004-2006 could not have occurred at a worse time, for the
financial market and the economy of those years were predicated on a real estate
boom that was dependent on low interest rates.
By raising the fed funds rate as many times as he did, Greenspan
essentially sealed the doom of the U.S. economy and stock market.
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